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Piecing together the fort of Shinkakasa 
Boma, the capital of the Congo Free State (État Indépendant du Congo or, from now on, 
EIC), was nothing like Georges Moulaert, a 25-year-old lieutenant who had joined the EIC’s 
Force Publique in 1902, had expected. The town he described in his memoirs, published in 
1948 was a mosquito-ridden swamp crossed by earthen embankments which were lined by 
rickety wooden trading posts of Italian, Portuguese and – to Moulaert’s surprise – even 
African fortune seekers.1 Despite Moulaert’s intentions “to objectively describe the reality he 
had witnessed”, his lively cityscape reflected more of his own feelings than he accounted for.2 
For example, Moulaert’s emphasis on the ricketiness of the ‘wooden shacks’ was probably 
directly related to his disdain towards the motley crew of coloured traders that inhabited them, 
just like the general lack of hygiene and infrastructure was probably inspired by his 
condescending view of the Bomatraciens with their “small bureaucratic mentality”.3 
 
Personal recollections, such as Moulaert’s, are often key sources in the historiography of early 
colonial Congo. After all, with the archive of the EIC systematically destroyed by king 
Leopold II prior to the takeover by Belgium, they are often the only textual sources of the 
period that remain.4 Despite their high historical value, we have to be extremely critical when 
using these memoirs as a historical source. Although historians of Congo (and Africa in 
general) go to great lengths to read such writings ‘against their grain’ in an attempt to ‘let the 
subaltern speak’, the texts upon which many histories are based, remain colonial through and 




through. As the many publications on the colonial archive suggest, historians are still 
struggling to find the adequate sources to complement this all too one-sided male, white 
(spatial) imaginary with other, subjugated, histories.5 The recent ‘visual turn’ towards 
colonial photography in the historiography of Africa can be understood as part of this attempt. 
Although these photographs are carefully constructed to convey a colonial message of success 
and modernity back home, they are more prone to contemporary reinterpretation. Or, as the 
visual historian Elizabeth Edwards phrases it, photographs are one of the means to “the 
gradual opening of spaces for ‘indigenous counter-narratives’, fragmenting the authoritative 
and monolithic power of ‘The Archive’”.6  
 
Often, passages of memoirs nevertheless found their way into the historiography of Congo 
through a less critical prism. Moulaert’s recollections of the construction of the fort of 
Shinkakasa – he was sent to Congo to supervise its building site – is a case in point. As the 
first concrete construction site in the Belgian Congo (and probably one of the first in the 
whole of sub-Saharan Africa), a critical rereading of the fort’s construction phase could 
contest the narrative of export that all too often defines the little scholarly work on the history 
of construction in the non-West.7 Despite the destruction of the EIC archives, three ‘critical 
prisms’ through which we can reassess the construction of the fort of Shinkakasa, still exist. 
 
The first is an extensive number of construction site pictures kept in the photographical 
collection of the Royal Museum of Central Africa (RMCA). Even though the intention of 
these photographs is obviously to showcase the success and advancement of the building site 
back home, a close reading from today’s point of view, allows us to reinterpret these images 
against the intended messages (conveyed by the original captions). Since these photographs, 
alongside Moulaert’s description, constitute the most important source for this paper, we 
decided to structure the text around five diptychs of photographs, allowing us to assess the 
friction within and between the different sources. The second is a set of miscellaneous 
archival documents that accidentally survived the Belgian king’s attempt to erase the history 
of his EIC; duplicates of official government files that were kept in personal archives, military 
correspondence and plans from the Force Publique archive or reworked original plans and 
technical documents that were used by the Belgian Congo’s Public Works Department.8 The 
challenge of piecing together all these bits and pieces into a coherent story, proved too 
difficult when contradictions in plans, descriptions and photographs, even prevented us from 
delineating the outline of the fort with certainty.9 As a result, we have to emphasize that the 




aim of this visual essay is rather to raise questions than to present a conclusive paper on the 
construction of fort Shinkakasa. The third ‘prism’, which to some extent could bring an end to 
these diverging realities, is the building itself. To this day, the fort is standing on the banks of 
the Congo river and would surely contain a treasury of information to a construction historian. 
Unfortunately, as we experienced during a field trip to Congo in 2017, the access to military 
and penitentiary buildings in Congo is extremely difficult. Fort Shinkakasa, in 1960 converted 
into a feared prison for political prisoners, will surely remain off-limits in the current political 
climate of the DRC.10 
  




“I want the biggest [gun] of them all!”11 
On Leopold II’s military ambitions in the EIC 
Figure 1. “View of the river, taken from Shinkakasa.” 1896. Photo: De Roy. RMCA. 
Figure 2. “Boma, 27 May 1900. Execution of 18 mutineers of fort Shinkakasa on the shooting range of Boma. 
On the foreground, the Whites of Boma, armed, overseeing the firing squad.” 1900. Photo: Habran and Van 
Iseghem. RMCA.  




The erection, from 1891 onwards, of a fortress at Shinkakasa, located within a stone’s throw 
of Boma responded to the increasing concern of the EIC’s government about the protection of 
the capital against competing territorial claims (notably by the Portuguese, who had expanded 
their influence in the region for centuries and occupied present-day Angola, just across the 
Congo river). Nevertheless, the choice for the installation of a permanent coastal battery was 
not undisputed. Much against the advice of his military counsellors about static fortifications 
being obsolete in an age and continent of gunboat diplomacy, Belgian king Leopold II took a 
resolute stand and turned away from the temporary fieldworks that had characterised the 
EIC’s fortification efforts up to this point. Holding on to the same doctrine of positional 
warfare that had (supposedly) turned Belgium into an impregnable fortress in previous 
decades12, Leopold declared that he wanted “the biggest [gun] of them all”.13 Soon after the 
instalment of eight large-calibre Krupp guns on an elevated terrain dominating the Congo 
estuary, it became evident that the initial wedge-shaped fort design by German gun 
manufacturer Krupp had been based upon inadequate topographical data, as it was dominated 
by a number of elevations lying behind the fort (named ‘Hill A’ and ‘B’). This fact resulted in 
the decision to convert the open brick battery into a closed concrete fort. To this purpose, the 
Belgian corps of engineers detached military engineers Emile Wangermée and Adolphe 
Mahieu (author of a number of the selected construction site pictures) to Shinkakasa. 
Wangermée had earned is his stripes as the designer of fort Suarlée nearby Namur, while 
working under the internationally celebrated Henri Alexis Brialmont, doyen of the Belgian 
fortification programme. Still, the problematic and unresolvable situation of the hills A and B 
remained a constant threat to the security of the fort, to the degree that at one point, a 
relocation of the fort to the island of Mateba in the Congo river was not only considered, but 
also thoroughly studied.14 Fig. 1, an image taken atop the dreaded Hill A, pictures the 
building site of the fort (at the far right) in its global surroundings and at the same time 
emphasises its vulnerability; at the horizon lies the capital of Boma, separated from the 
Portuguese territories only by the Congo river and Shinkakasa’s guns. The military 
obsolescence of the entire endeavour is illustrated by a draft letter from the Ministry of 
Colonies, in reply to a request by the Belgian Royal Military Academy to include Shinkakasa 
in its courses on military engineering.15 The reply states that the shortcomings of the fort are 
all too well-known and that it would be unwise to include Shinkakasa as an example. A 
handwritten note on the same letter, in a manner typical to be found in military archives, 
further suggests not to send the written letter, but instead to convey the message to the 
academy informally and discretely – just in case. 





Quickly caught up by ballistic and political evolutions, the fort never really served its 
purpose, even though its ‘biggest guns’ were quite successful in producing the noise 
necessary to dissuade future unwanted visitors to drop anchor before Boma.16 In fact, the only 
significant military use of the fort was in the course of 1900: during the final stages of its 
construction, the fort was the scene of a particularly painful incident, when Leopold’s own 
Force Publique rebelled against working conditions on the construction site and turned the 
guns towards the capital (Fig. 2). 
  




“We were soldiers; they turned us into slaves!”17 
 On the sociology of the building site 
Figure 3. “Construction at Shinkakasa.” 1898. Photo: Mahieu. RMCA. 
Figure 4. “Construction of the fort of Shinkakasa. Formwork of gallery I-II.” 1899. Photo: Mahieu. RMCA. 




According to Moulaert’s description of the building site, the somewhat 200 soldiers of the 
artillery company that manned the initial brick battery of Shinkakasa, were also responsible 
for its subsequent transformation into a closed concrete fort, decided upon in 1893. The 
morning schedule of the soldiers involved shooting practice, while at noon they were placed 
as construction labourers under guidance of two European artisans, the Italian bricklayer Torti 
and an unnamed Belgian carpenter.18 As such, the building site was incorporated in the 
paternalist discourse that justified colonialism (and the violence it entailed) as a civilising 
mission. Nevertheless, through a close reading of the photographical diptych (Figs 3 and 4) 
we can start to formulate a hypothesis about the complex composition of the construction 
site’s labour force and of the hierarchies that existed between different African and European 
actors, beyond the simple black-and-white depiction by Moulaert. 
 
In Fig. 3, an African soldier, dressed in the official uniform of the Force Publique, is 
overlooking the harsh manual work of the labourers in the ditch. Among the labourers, a 
European overseer seems closely involved in the effort, pausing only to pose for the 
photograph. The author of the photograph, the captain Mahieu, who was supervising the 
construction site, obviously remains out of the picture. The most striking presence in the 
photograph however, are the two African characters looking towards the scene from a small 
distance. Both of them are seemingly dressed in the latest European fashion; besides the straw 
hat, the man in the front wears a costume, a scarf, shoes and a walking stick, the other – 
probably female – figure wears a dress. In the second picture (Fig. 4), a group of Africans is 
posing on top of the wooden formwork of the fort. Although barefoot, all of them are dressed 
in a European style and stand in sharp contrast with the manual labourers. Two out of the 
three Europeans in the picture – who are all looking directly into the camera – are wearing a 
helmet, the one with the hammer in his hand however, wears a simple cap. 
 
We will attempt to evaluate the exact role of these characters and to contextualize these 
photographs by confronting them to prior research on the social history of the region and to 
Moulaert’s own description of the Shinkakasa uprising in an annex to his memoirs; at several 
takes contradictory to what he writes earlier about the fort’s construction.19 First, we have to 
understand the difficulties the EIC was facing in the recruitment of labour. The Bas-Congo 
region, already strongly depopulated as a result from an epidemic of sleeping sickness20, was 
further strained at the end of the 19th century by a mass migration of people fleeing from the 
state’s forced recruitment. In particular the humiliating service de portage21 and the 




murderous conditions that reigned on the construction site of the railway between Matadi and 
Léopoldville22, turned the state recruiters of the Public Works into one of the most feared 
proponents of Leopold’s colonial empire. As such, the EIC had serious difficulties to raise the 
adequate workforce for Shinkakasa. A first remedy was to involve the soldiers of the Force 
Publique in the manual labour; both in a direct way by incorporating construction duties into 
the soldiers’ daily schedule, and in an indirect way, by recruiting worker-soldiers on the army 
payroll. Far more than other colonial armies in Africa, the Force Publique relied on 
indigenous recruits, whose potential both as soldiers and workers was acknowledged by EIC 
officials.23 A second solution was to call in the help of local chiefs in the (forced) recruitment 
of non-military workers in the surrounding villages. These chiefs were well compensated for 
their services to the state, with some of them even living in villas envied by low-ranked 
colonials.24 The well-dressed figures (Fig. 4), might be part of this African ‘high-society’. The 
building site’s social stratification is even more complex when we take into account that 
soldiers were deliberately recruited from all over Congo, and that often a combination of 
official wives, concubines and children travelled along.25 
 
That such a complex society led to certain frictions is clear from the events during the 1900 
uprising. The worker-soldiers – some were the instigators of riots elsewhere in the EIC, 
brought to Shinkakasa for rehabilitation – became increasingly dissatisfied with their social 
position compared to the actual soldiers of the Force Publique. When they were forced to 
prolong their term for another seven-year period, the situation became untenable and the 
worker-soldiers took over the fort. Among the wounded of the mutiny was the Spanish 
bricklayer Estevez, not mentioned by Moulaert in his memoirs up to this point. Probably, 
Estevez worked as a craftsman in Boma, and he might even have had his own African 
employees. This could explain the well-trained African carpenters in Fig. 5 and the presence 
of many non-military European craftsmen in several photographs. As such, Moulaert’s 
omission from his memoirs of these low-ranking European labourers probably fits in the 
difficult position of the poor whites within a colonial context.26 
  




“Forbidden entrance.”  
On the local and the imported 
Figure 5. “Carpenter’s workshop at fort Shinkakasa.” [The sign reads: “Forbidden entrance”] Date unknown. 
Photo: Mahieu. RMCA. 
Figure 6. “Constructions at Shinkakasa. Officers’ mess.” 1896. Photo: De Roy. RMCA.  




Throughout the colonial period, the government holds a complex position towards local 
building industries and techniques; at once constantly downplaying them as being ‘non-
durable’ yet surreptitiously having to rely on them in the absence of affordable or workable 
alternatives. In the conception of the fort of Shinkakasa, one can discern a similar disdain 
about local materials. Take, for example, the wood used in the fort. Both from photographs 
(Fig. 5) and from the day-to-day-tasks of the African carpenters, their ability to execute even 
the most difficult assignments with ease is evident (including the manufacturing of tool 
handles or the reparation of wheelbarrows). 27 Yet, notwithstanding the cost savings that the 
use of locally produced planks for the concrete’s formwork could have offered, all timber for 
shuttering was imported from Belgium and local wood as only used for scaffolding and 
temporary supports. A similar story can be told about the bricks, the cement and – early in the 
construction – even the rocks, which were all imported from Belgium, despite the production 
of local alternatives, which were well-known to the colonials.28 Both the colonial disdain vis-
à-vis these local building materials and the economy they would nevertheless entail for 
building in the colony, is literally reflected in the budget estimations of the fort’s construction, 
where only imported materials are taken into account. 
 
This obsession with imported materials is all the more striking when we look closer at the 
images that are juxtaposed here. In both pictures, we can see how colonials were forced to use 
local building materials to construct the roofs over their heads, in sharp contrast with the fort, 
erected in the material of the future; concrete. In that respect, the narrative of the construction 
of the officers’ mess is particularly telling.29 The mess was built in 1893 using bricks that 
were imported from Boom in Belgium. Its roof, brick vaulting topped with a layer of 
concrete, doubled its potential use as a small redoubt. From Fig. 6, we can see that by 1896, 
the mess was covered with an indigenous-style pitched roof. Why this roof was added remains 
unclear. Reports on serious leaks in the brick roof structure in 1910 however, lead us to think 
that a similar issue might have arisen in 1896 already. The eventual solution in 1910, to cover 
the whole roof with Ruberoid sheeting imported from Europe, confirms the distrust in local 
building techniques that were relied on earlier. 




“A vast workplace of concrete and excavation.”30 
On the manual, the mechanical and military efficiency 
Figure 7. “SS ‘Akassa’ unloading gravel at Shinkakasa.” Date unknown. Photo: Shanu. RMCA. 
Figure 8. “C.O.F. Construction of fort Shinkakasa.” 1871. Photo: Schievers. RMCA.  




Drawing upon military building expertise in the metropole, the construction of the fort relied 
on rather advanced site equipment; an astonishing, yet at the same time logical feat, 
considering the military engineering background of some the involved protagonists. A 
purpose-built pier (Fig. 7) allowed for the mooring of larger steamers (but also of small 
canoes, as Moulaert recalls) and a dredger capable of extracting sand from the river to mix 
into the concrete. 31 From the pier, materials were dispatched to the artisans’ workshops and 
to different parts of the building site through a network of manually operated narrow-gauge 
Decauville railroads. The construction site even disposed of an aerial cableway (Fig. 8), quite 
identical to an example used in the construction of the Malonne fort near Namur.32 As a 
whole, the advanced equipment of the building site at Shinkakasa expresses the military 
interest in construction efficiency, and some of the surviving photographs go to great lengths 
to establish this image. Even if its most renown proponent Frederick Winslow Taylor would 
not apply principles of scientific management on the organisation of the construction site 
before 1905, clearly building efficiency techniques had always captured the imagination of 
the military.33  
 
Yet, Figs 7 and 8, upon closer look, also hint towards the failure of such an efficiency-
obsessed approach in the context of the colonial building site, and offer a more nuanced 
reading. One wonders, for instance, why the Decauville track in Fig. 7 is not used to unload 
and transport boulders from the steamer and why the builders of the fort feel the necessity to 
revert to head-carrying. In this context, archival materials such as the detailed monthly reports 
on the spending of man-hours, reveal a glimpse of the problems that needed to be tackled 
under the harsh working conditions at Shinkakasa, among them continuous repair jobs and 
maintenance of the narrow-gauge track, its wagons, wooden handles for tools and other 
construction site equipment.34 Nevertheless, Fig. 7, credited to the intriguing figure of 
Herzekiah Andrew Shanu (a Nigeria-born entrepreneur, serviceman of the EIC and owner of a 
nearby small factory which was looted during the 1900 rebellion), was later included in a 
widely published series of postcards on the environment of Boma; pictures which 
significantly contributed to the constructed image of the colony in the metropole.35 In a 
similar fashion, Fig. 8 shows the aerial cableway and the Decauville track in full operation, at 
the same time contrasting them with the piles of gravel, of which we know from other pictures 
in the RMCA archives and from the descriptions by Moulaert that it was, at least partly, 
created from the manual grinding of rocks that had been collected from the terrain or 
excavated from the main ditch of the fort and the ground levelling works.36  




“We talk on the phone to Boma.”37 
On the remote and the improvised 
Figure 9. “Works at fort Shinkakasa.” Author and date unknown. RMCA. 
Figure 10. “Pigeon loft in Shinkakasa.” 1899. Photo: Mahieu. RMCA.  




As we have seen, the pier below the fort constituted the only connection between the building 
site at Shinkakasa, the capital and the metropole for quite some time. In his memoirs, 
Moulaert recalls that a road between Boma and Shinkakasa was built only in 1904. The 
stretch of roughly three kilometres of various terrain (covering swamps, rivers and rocky area) 
served as a test case to determine the overall costs of road construction for the EIC (in the end 
calculated on 7,000 francs per kilometre on average). This happened at a time when transport 
relied mainly on service de portage and experiments were underway to establish road and rail 
networks in the region, in an attempt to make the transport system less dependent on 
indigenous labour and terrain knowledge.38 In addition, Moulaert proposed a standardised 
scheme for a bridge in timber frames and steel cables, capable of spanning between 15 and 20 
metres.39 Fig. 9 shows exactly this type of improvised bridge on the building site, crossing the 
main ditch of the fort and carrying the Decauville track and its man-powered wagons to 
accommodate the concrete casting of the main body of the work. 
 
The continuous va-et-vient of personnel, materials and intelligence between the colony and 
the homeland, as well as the communications within the EIC’s military tailored hierarchy 
itself, generated a considerable bulk of correspondence, which was subsequently organised 
according to military reporting principles and means of transmission.40 A 1911 report of the 
Comité d’ Etudes pour l’examen de la défense du Bas-Congo offers an overview and 
assessment of the different modes of military communication transmission at disposal.41 The 
report admits the impossibility to establish an intelligence network similar to the one existing 
in Belgium, and promotes simplicity and reliability as key requirements for communications 
with and within the colony. Much hope was placed in wireless telegraphy, which was being 
installed in the EIC at the moment; an endeavour to which both Moulaert and Wangermée 
contributed considerably. But, as the report of the Comité d’Etudes remarks, the technology 
was still in its infancy and subject to technical issues and interruptions caused by the climate, 
the vast distances and the topographical conditions. As it was, a first connection between 
Boma and Brussels would not be established before 1914.42 An overground fixed telephone 
line existed between Boma and Matadi; as well as a local telephone network connecting the 
fort’s fire control station to the main guns and the advanced observation post on Hill A. 
During exercises, these fixed telephone lines proved unreliable in case of military events; the 
humidity and constant threat of overgrowing made the system sensitive to rust and short-
circuiting.43 The members of the Comité d’Etudes therefore reverted to the less technological 
solution of a pigeon postal service as primary means for reliable transmission in the event of 




war. As it was, Shinkakasa disposed of a military pigeon loft (Fig. 10), strategically attached 
to the officers’ mess. The report concluded that a network of pigeon postal services within a 
100-kilometre radius around the capital “would be able to transmit messages, under all 
circumstances, to Boma, maintaining a 24-hour advantage to the enemy at least”.44 
 
Together, both photographs demonstrate the failure of top-down military planning and 
engineering in the colonial context. Both in terms of building site logistics and everyday 
communication, the builders of Shinkakasa were forced to abandon cutting-edge 
technological solutions and textbook military procedures in favour of slower and low-tech 
answers, relying on a combination of improvisational skills and indigenous knowhow. As 
white officers needed to forget what they had learned in Belgian staff-college and were 
habituated to local fighting tactics, they were also required to become accustomed to local 
knowledge on a wide range of very diverse practical matters, of which building practice was 
just one.45  
  




More questions than answers? 
The reading of Shinkakasa’s construction photographs reveals a far more complex and 
layered social microcosm, that goes into the simplistic black-and-white hierarchy that is 
generally accepted in the context of the colonial building site. The juxtaposition of the 
photographs to Moulaert’s description of the fort’s construction and other archival fragments 
supports an alternative narrative, from which the one-directional knowledge transfer from 
white military personnel to the unskilled native labourer can start to be questioned at least.  
 
At the same time the photographs affirm the difficulties encountered at a remote and ill-
connected colonial construction site with respect to building logistics and transport of 
imported materials, both from the metropole to the colony as on the building site itself. 
Clearly, the failure of top-down military planning towards design and construction of the fort 
adds to the degree of improvisation. This self-reliance, can also be seen in the (albeit 
reluctant) adoption of local materials and building techniques. Although neglected in the 
fort’s historiography, notably in Moulaert’s own depictions, some of the juxtaposed pictures, 
when compared to the archival sources, reveal precisely this dependence on indigenous 
knowledge, contesting the feeble narrative of European ‘modernity’ transposed to the colony. 
 
Even if such an alternative story, due to the diverse, dispersed, fragmented and accidental 
nature of its archival sources is necessarily interpretative, the case of Shinkakasa is 
instrumental in raising exactly those questions that are omitted from history. As a result, this 
visual essay is far from conclusive. More than providing definitive answers, it adds new 
questions towards building intricacies on the colonial construction site. 
  





This paper is partly based on research financed through a four-year FWO-project n° 
G053215N (2015–2018) entitled ‘Tout le Congo est un chantier: Re-assessing Congo’s 
architectural history from 1918 to 1975 through a construction history approach.’ 
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